Apple’s manufacturing vendors owed it $39.896 billion on 26 September, the end of its fiscal year, according to the balance sheet in the fourth-quarter financial statements it released on 2 November. That is up $6.716 billion, or 20.2%, from $33.180 billion a year earlier, and up 21.5% from $32.833 billion in September 2024, by our arithmetic.
It is also the highest quarter-end balance in Apple’s XBRL filings data on SEC EDGAR, by our count of the 67 quarter-end values there, which start in September 2009 (December 2009 and March 2010 are not tagged). The previous high was $35.040 billion in December 2021. The line is called vendor non-trade receivables, and Apple does not discuss it in the release.
Business Pill · Vertical Integration
An evergreen Business Engineer explainer on vertical integration. It teaches the general idea only and does not discuss Apple’s receivables or results.
The key insight: By our arithmetic, the $39.896 billion Apple’s manufacturing vendors owed it on 26 September is 20.2% more than a year earlier and the highest of the 67 quarter-end values in its XBRL data since 2009, and the balance was already 43% higher in June; over seven years it has equalled 33% to 50% of the next quarter’s iPhone sales, without moving reliably with them.
Apple’s 10-K for fiscal 2025 defines it: “The Company has non-trade receivables from certain of its manufacturing vendors resulting from the sale of components to these vendors who manufacture subassemblies or assemble final products for the Company”. It adds: “The Company purchases these components directly from suppliers”.
Put simply, Apple buys parts, sells them on to the companies that build its devices, and is owed for them until those companies are paid for the finished product. The 10-K says “The Company does not reflect the sale of these components in products net sales”; any gain on those sales reduces products cost of sales instead.
The 10-K also says two vendors accounted for 46% and 23% of the balance on 27 September 2025, and its risk factors say “the Company’s vendor non-trade receivables were concentrated among a few individual vendors located primarily in Asia”.
Apple’s vendor non-trade receivables, money its manufacturing vendors owe it for components, at every quarter end from September 2018 to 26 September 2026, $ billion; September quarter ends in red. Values from Apple’s balance sheets via SEC EDGAR XBRL and the FY2026 Q4 statements; the year-on-year change is our arithmetic. An indicator, not Apple guidance.Animated: Apple’s vendor non-trade receivables at each September fiscal year end, 2009 to 2026, $ billion (values rounded). From Apple’s 10-K balance sheets via SEC EDGAR XBRL and the FY2026 Q4 statements; the year-on-year change is our arithmetic. An indicator, not Apple guidance.
A September Spike, Every Year
The balance is seasonal. In each of the 17 fiscal years from 2010 to 2026, the September figure was higher than the June figure, our count from the XBRL series. That fits the definition: the components for the holiday quarter’s devices are sold to the assemblers ahead of it.
This year the build showed up early. Vendor non-trade receivables were $27.509 billion on 27 June, 43% above the $19.278 billion of June 2025, by our arithmetic. The June-to-September rise was $12.387 billion, or 1.45 times, against $13.902 billion, or 1.72 times, a year earlier; 1.45 times is the smallest step-up since 2015, our arithmetic.
For fiscal 2026 as a whole, the cash flow statement shows the line absorbing $6.716 billion of cash, against $347 million in fiscal 2025.
Does It Track the Next iPhone Quarter?
We set each September balance against iPhone net sales in the December quarter that followed, from Apple’s 10-Qs. Over the seven years from September 2019 to September 2025, the balance equalled between 33% and 50% of the next quarter’s iPhone sales, by our arithmetic. December 2025 iPhone sales were $85.269 billion, so September 2025’s balance was 39% of them.
The year-on-year changes line up poorly. In only two of the six years from 2020 to 2025 did the September balance and the following December quarter’s iPhone sales move in the same direction, our count. The September 2022 balance rose 29.8%, and December-quarter iPhone sales then fell 8%; the September 2025 balance rose 1.1%, and iPhone sales then rose 23%, according to the 10-Qs and our arithmetic.
On that record, the line is an indicator of how many components Apple had placed with its assemblers at year end, not a forecast of sales, and we do not use it as one. Component prices, the mix of parts Apple buys itself and the timing of launches all move it.
What Apple Has Said About the December Quarter
The release contains no outlook. On the earnings call, Apple guided to December-quarter total revenuegrowth of 7% to 10%, according to CNBC’s report, as we covered here. That is a total-revenue range, not an iPhone figure.
As we read it, the line shows how much of the components Apple buys itself were sitting with its assemblers at year end, still owed to Apple: the 10-K says Apple buys the components directly from suppliers and sells them to the vendors that build its products.
As we read it, the build was visible a quarter early: the June balance of $27.509 billion was 43% above a year earlier, and the June-to-September step-up of 1.45 times was the smallest since 2015, by our arithmetic.
Apple Inc., Form 10-K for fiscal 2025
“The Company has non-trade receivables from certain of its manufacturing vendors resulting from the sale of components to these vendors who manufacture subassemblies or assemble final products for the Company.”
Three Implications
FOR THE ASSEMBLERS Two vendors accounted for 46% and 23% of the balance on 27 September 2025, according to the 10-K; it does not name them.
FOR CASH FLOW The line absorbed $6.716 billion of operating cash in fiscal 2026, against $347 million in fiscal 2025, according to the cash flow statement.
FOR THE 10-K The fiscal 2026 10-K, not yet filed when we wrote, is the next filing that can show the vendor concentration at 26 September 2026.
The framework puts it this way: “The digital economy rests on a physical foundation that most people in that economy never see.”
As we read it, vendor non-trade receivables are one place where that foundation shows on Apple’s balance sheet, and its 10-K says the balance is concentrated among a few vendors located primarily in Asia. The framework was published in December 2025, is about critical materials and processing for AI, and does not discuss Apple.
This piece is based on Apple’s fiscal 2026 fourth-quarter condensed consolidated financialstatements, released on 2 November, its fiscal 2025 10-K, its December-quarter 10-Qs for fiscal 2021 to 2026, and the XBRL series for the vendor non-trade receivables line on SEC EDGAR. Changes, ratios, the step-ups and the direction count are our arithmetic. Apple does not explain why the balance rose, which vendors account for it at 26 September or what components it covers. The fiscal 2026 10-K had not been filed when we wrote. We did not contact Apple.
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Apple’s manufacturing vendors owed it $39.896 billion on 26 September, up 20.2% in a year and the highest quarter end in its XBRL data since 2009, by our arithmetic. The balance rises every September as Apple sells components to its assemblers, and this year it was already up 43% in June. Its size has not reliably tracked the next quarter’s iPhone sales, and Apple has guided only total revenue.
A note on sourcing. Every company figure comes from Apple’s fiscal 2026 fourth-quarter condensed consolidated financialstatements, released on 2 November 2026, its fiscal 2025 10-K, its December-quarter 10-Qs and the XBRL series on SEC EDGAR, read on 2 November. Changes, ratios, step-ups and counts are our arithmetic. The guidance range is as reported by CNBC. We did not contact Apple.
Gennaro Cuofano is a CRO and tech executive who has worked in AI since late 2015, starting with bringing NLP, natural-language generation, voice and chatbot products to the marketing industry. His background is in law and finance: he holds a Master's degree in Law and an International MBA with an emphasis on corporate finance (LUISS Business School and the University of San Diego, 2012), and worked as a financial analyst at a real-estate investment firm in San Diego and as an assistant controller. His work focuses on business model strategy, business engineering and, more broadly, structural analysis: how companies make money, read from their own filings. He created FourWeekMBA and leads research there and at The Business Engineer, his newsletter on AI and business strategy, with over 95,000 subscribers and more than 1,000 published analyses. His writing has also appeared on Entrepreneur (for example, How to Digitize a Family Business in Europe) and HackerNoon. Find him on LinkedIn and Substack. See how we source.
