HSBC websites in 11 markets, from the United States and Hong Kong to Egypt and the Philippines, were among the 178 organisations whose Optimizely Web code carried malicious JavaScript on 16 November, according to the full list security firm Report URI published in its report by Scott Helme.
That is 11 of the 32 banking and finance entries on the list, about a third, by our count. Optimizely’s public notice on its status page is timed 01:02 UTC on 17 November, 20 hours and 41 minutes after the first injection Report URI recorded, by our arithmetic. Our first report on the attack is here.
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The key insight: Report URI’s list of 178 organisations whose Optimizely code carried malicious JavaScript on 16 November includes HSBC sites in 11 markets, 11 of the 32 banking and finance entries; five brand names account for 32 of the 178 entries, 18% by our count, and Optimizely’s status notice came 20 hours and 41 minutes after the first injection Report URI recorded, by our arithmetic.
The 11 HSBC Entries
Report URI’s banking and finance group lists HSBC US, HSBC Hong Kong, HSBC Mexico, HSBC Singapore, HSBC Australia, HSBC UAE, HSBC Malaysia, HSBC Taiwan, HSBC Vietnam, HSBC Egypt and HSBC Philippines. The Singapore entry is an insurance site, http://www.insurance.hsbc.com.sg.
Report URI says HSBC’s content security policy blocked the external script and the data theft, but an inline copy of the payload still ran through eval. iTWire reported that Hudson Rock found complete fallback copies embedded in poisoned scripts associated with the BBC and HSBC UAE.
Being on the list means a site served the code to visitors, not that HSBC’s own systems were breached. Hudson Rock cautioned that an affected public page does not establish a breach of the organisation’s internal systems, iTWire reported. Reuters reported that HSBC was among the companies that did not immediately respond to its requests for comment.

Five Names, 32 Entries
Report URI counts each country site as its own organisation. Grouping the entries by the brand name in Report URI’s own labels, five names account for 32 of the 178 entries, or 18%, by our count: HSBC with 11, Levi’s with 8, Fluke with 6, Equifax with 4 and Covetrus with 3.
The Levi’s entries are its sites for Japan, Indonesia, Australia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Korea and New Zealand. The Equifax entries are Equifax, Equifax Canada, Equifax UK and The Work Number (Equifax). The Fluke entries include RaySafe (Fluke), which Report URI files under healthcare.
Report URI says the list is a floor. “The real number is likely higher as we could only check snippets we could find in time”, it says, after checking 1,611 distinct snippets and finding 188 infected.
How Optimizely Responded
Report URI puts the first Optimizely injection, in the BBC’s snippet, at 04:21 UTC on 16 November. Its sweep between 19:24 and 19:59 UTC found 186 of 1,611 snippets infected, and a mass clean-up ran from about 20:40 to 21:10 UTC. At 21:52 UTC only TalkTalk’s snippet still carried the code.
Report URI says that once it was confident Optimizely was the source, it tried to reach the company through several channels. “At the time of publication, we have not had any response”, it wrote. It also says Smartsheet’s snippet was cleaned at one point and then re-infected with a hidden version, so whoever wrote the code still had access at the time.
Optimizely’s status page entry, timed 01:02 UTC on 17 November, says an unauthorized party exploited a vulnerability in Experimentation, and that Optimizely has fixed it and removed the injected code from affected projects. That entry came 20 hours and 41 minutes after the first injection and 3 hours and 10 minutes after Report URI’s 21:52 UTC check, by our arithmetic. When we re-checked the page at 07:30 UTC, it was still the only update.
An Optimizely spokesperson told Cointelegraph the company had blocked access to the vulnerable path, deployed a fix, ended active sessions, revoked tokens, reset access for affected user accounts and notified all affected customers. The Hacker News noted that the notice does not say when the fix went in.
The Structural Read
As we read Report URI’s list, one vendor reached one bank in 11 markets at once: each HSBC country site loaded its own Optimizely snippet, and each one carried the code.
As we read the timing, Report URI’s own sweep and the mass clean-up came before Optimizely’s public notice; the notice is timed 3 hours and 10 minutes after Report URI’s 21:52 UTC check, by our arithmetic.
As we read the counts, the 178 figure counts country sites separately; grouped by the brand names in Report URI’s labels, five names make up 32 of the entries, by our count.
Report URI, in its report
“At the time of publication, we have not had any response”
Three Implications
FOR BANKS AND OTHER MULTI-MARKET BRANDS Report URI lists HSBC sites in 11 markets, so one vendor project setting can reach every country site that loads it.
FOR SECURITY TEAMS Report URI says HSBC’s policy blocked the external script and the data theft, but an inline copy still ran through eval.
FOR CUSTOMERS Report URI advises anyone who paid by card on an affected site on 16 November to watch their statements and to update iPhones and iPads.
The Business Engineer Lens
This story maps onto the Business Engineer framework Enterprise AI: From Software to Substrate.
The analysis says: “This is the Embedding Mental Model: enterprise vendors don’t sell software anymore—they sell irreversibility.”
As we read it, the Optimizely attack shows the security side of that depth: one vendor snippet sat on HSBC sites in 11 markets. The analysis does not discuss this attack.
What Is Not Established
The sources we read do not give the time Optimizely closed the vulnerability or the time it notified customers. They do not say who the attacker is, how many card numbers were taken, or whether any HSBC customer lost money. Report URI says it cannot see how many cards or cookies reached the attacker’s server.
The Bottom Line
HSBC sites in 11 markets were on Report URI’s list of 178 organisations whose Optimizely code carried malicious JavaScript on 16 November, and five brand names make up 32 of the entries by our count. Optimizely’s public notice came 20 hours and 41 minutes after the first injection Report URI recorded, by our arithmetic.
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A note on sourcing. The list of organisations, the HSBC entries, the timeline and Report URI’s outreach come from Report URI’s report of 16 November 2026 by Scott Helme, which we read in full. Optimizely’s words are from its status page entry of 17 November 2026, which we re-checked at 07:30 UTC, and its spokesperson’s statement to Cointelegraph. Hudson Rock’s findings are as reported by iTWire; the comment requests are as reported by Reuters; the note on what the notice omits is The Hacker News’s.
The brand groupings, shares and time gaps are our count and our arithmetic. Being named in Report URI’s list means a site served the script, not that the organisation was breached.
Sources: Report URI: World’s Largest Brands Infected With Malware Via Optimizely (16 Nov 2026) · Optimizely status page: Web Experimentation Security Incident (17 Nov 2026) · Cointelegraph (16 Nov 2026) · iTWire (17 Nov 2026) · The Hacker News (17 Nov 2026) · Reuters, via U.S. News (16 Nov 2026)









